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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to familiarize scholars and 
professionals involved in the fields of law and economy with Competition Law issues 
which may emerge from a conglomerate merger. Hardly any other area of competition 
law is as controversial among competition economists and competition law experts as 
this type of merger. Conglomerate mergers may produce pro-competitive effects 
resulting in the realization of economies of scale, but they can also cause negative 
effects, harming consumer welfare. This work aims to contribute to this discussion and 
illustrate the main competition concerns. The market strategies of tying/bundling and 
the role of the so-called ‘’portfolio’’ or ‘’range’’ effects are analyzed in detailed.  
Recent decisions of the European Commission reveal an increased pursuit of 
conglomerate cases. One of these, Microsoft/LinkedIn, attracted much attention 
because: a) it was one of the rare conglomerate merger cases which in the recent 
decisional practice of the Commission was found likely to give rise to competition 
concerns, b) the relevant market for professional social networking (PSN) services was 
defined for the first time and, c) different theories of competition harm were 
considered regarding conglomerate effects. This dissertation looks into the 
Commission’s decision, as well as into two other noteworthy decisions, GE/ Honeywell 
and Tetra Laval / Sidel, which are of great significance for the analysis of conglomerate 
effects.  
I would like to acknowledge my supervisor Professor Thomas Papadopoulos for 
his advice, guidance and support. To my family, friends and especially Bill Batsios, 
thank you all for encouraging me to complete this LL.M program. 
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Introduction 
One of the most controversial areas in Competition Law is the Merger control as 
mergers can facilitate the growth and the industrial expansion of the merging 
companies, but in parallel they can create strong monopolies, hurting the free 
competition and consumers’ interests.  
Τhe possibility of a merger to alter market structure and make the participating 
undertakings of this market less competitive, resulting in negative consequences for 
consumers, is being examined with particular care by the competent competition 
authorities. Mergers can be horizontal or non- horizontal (vertical or conglomerate). In 
practice, they usually entail both horizontal and non-horizontal effects.  
Generally, conglomerate mergers do not result in the direct elimination of 
competitors and do not constitute a significant impediment to effective competition 
because of their nature. However, there are certain circumstances in which they may 
produce anti-competitive effects and harm competition. These effects occur when the 
post-merger entity is capable of leveraging its power in one market in which has a 
dominant position into another different market by using various strategies, such as 
tying and bundling. 
The European Commission, the principal enforcer of the EU’s competition rules, 
has the responsibility to investigate suspected anticompetitive conduct and prohibit 
mergers with a community dimension, capable of reducing effective competition in the 
single market. Over the past decades, the European Commission has been dealing only 
to a limited extent with merger cases involving conglomerate effects; however recent 
developments in merger control reveal an increased pursuit in this field of Competition 
Law. 
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I.CONGLOMERATE MERGER 
Mergers can be divided in three main types: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. In 
the third category, which will be discussed in detail, three subclasses can be 
distinguished.     
A. DEFINITION OF CONGLOMERATE MERGER 
Conglomerate mergers are mergers between undertakings that are in a relationship 
which is neither horizontal (competitors in the same relevant market) nor vertical 
(suppliers or customers), and in the majority of circumstances they do not lead to any 
competition concerns1.  
What constitutes a potential competitive or customer-supplier relationship 
may differ across different jurisdictions. However, there is a common consensus that 
on the one hand, there are no horizontal overlaps where “neither firm was exerting 
any competitive discipline on the other prior to the merger” and on the other hand, a 
vertical relationship exists “where a party to a merger is presently competing with 
another party’s current supplier or client”2.     
Conglomerate mergers often include companies that supply complementary 
products3 (products that are used together, for example ink and photocopies), 
products being targeted at the same group of buyers4 or products that belong to a set 
generally requested by the same intermediate clients5. Due to this complementarity of 
the merging parties’ products, a conglomerate merger may be an indirect way to avoid 
                                                 
1 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C265/6, 
para. 5  
2 OECD, Portfolio effects in conglomerate mergers (DAFFE/COMP (2002)5), 21  
3 Complementary products can be categorized into: technical complements (when they 
must be consumed together for technical reasons), economic complements (products 
that usually are consumed together, e.g. milk and coffee) and commercial 
complements (when they are part of a range which downstream agents must carry), 
OECD (2002), 7  
4 Adrian Proctor, ‘Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure’ 
(2015) 4(38)World Competition , <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68137/> 
accessed 29 December 2018 (p. 1)   
5 Götz Drauz, ‘Unbundling GE/Honeywell: the assessment of conglomerate mergers 
under EC Competition Law’ (2001) 25(4) Fordham International Law Journal 885 
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a harmful price war through the creation of an entity able to act strategically and 
eliminate competitors, or a medium for the implementation of a collusive 
collaboration with other undertakings of the relevant market6.  
This type of merger may also join together unrelated types of undertakings, in a 
portfolio of company purchases by a holding company7.   
  
B. DISTINCTION FROM HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL MERGER 
Horizontal and vertical mergers are two other tools that companies can use to reform 
their structure.  
Horizontal mergers are of greatest concern for competition authorities as they 
involve a removal of actual or potential competitors from a particular market8. 
Generally speaking, this type can be distinguished quite easily from the conglomerate 
merger, as it results from the combination of two or more undertakings that operate in 
the same product and geographical market and at the same level of production or 
distribution cycle9. However, the distinction between conglomerate and horizontal 
mergers may be some times difficult, especially when a conglomerate merger involves 
products that are weak substitutes for each other10. 
Vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers belong to the same broad category 
of ‘’non-horizontal mergers’’, but the difference is that vertical mergers involve 
undertakings operating at different levels of the supply chain of a product, for example 
a merger between a manufacturer of a product (the upstream firm) and one of its 
distributors (the downstream firm), while conglomerate mergers concern companies 
that do not have this kind of vertical integration11. Vertical mergers may have anti-
competitive effects if they foreclose other market participants at either level of the 
market and deprive them of competitive opportunities that existed before the merger; 
                                                 
6 Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 281 
7 B Roger and A MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK (4th edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 412 
8 R Whish and D Balley, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 820 
9 Alina Kaczorowska, European Union Law (3rd edn, Routledge 2013) 907 
10
 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C31/5, paras. 5 supra 
note 5 
11 Ibid, para. 4-5  
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for example if a producer cannot find a retail store for his products due to a merger 
between another producer of similar products and a distributor12. Nonetheless, in 
cases where products are supplied by some undertakings with the inputs already 
integrated while other undertakings allow their customers to select and combine the 
inputs of the production, the distinction between vertical and conglomerate overlaps 
is not obvious13.     
Based on the above categorization, it becomes evident that a) horizontal 
mergers raise antitrust concerns because they cause competitors’ elimination and can 
lead to an output restriction and price raise, b) vertical mergers may similarly enable 
the merged entity to restrict output and increase prices, through the elimination of a 
key supplier or a customer, whereas c) conglomerate mergers make the merged 
company a stronger competitor which has the possibility to use leveraging practices 
(for example to reduce prices and increase output) in order to achieve the market exit 
of its rivals, provided that those would not be able to use countermeasures14.      
  
C. TYPES OF CONGLOMERATE MERGER 
Three types of conglomerate merger can be identified: 1) product line extension, 2) 
market extension and 3) pure conglomerates.  
1) A product line extension arises when one company merges with another and 
adds new products to its existing, 2) a market extension involves different 
undertakings operated in the same product market but in different geographical 
markets before their merger and 3) pure conglomerates occur where there is no 
functional connection between the merging parties and consequently, there is no 
product-line or market extension15.  
 
     
                                                 
12 B Roger and A MacCulloch, 276 
13 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 5 supra note 5 
14 William Kolasky, ‘Conglomerate mergers and range effects: It’s a long way from 
Chicago to Brussels’ (2001-2002) 10 (3) George Mason Law Review 535 
15 Alina Kaczorowska, 907 
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II.CONGLOMERATE EFFECTS 
Since there is no standard definition of conglomerate effects, their function and 
characteristics arise from the categories in which these effects can be integrated with 
regard to competition16. 
  
A. ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
i) Non-coordinated effects (tying, bundling and portfolio effects) 
Non-coordinated effects occur when, after a merger, the merged entity acquires the 
ability to exercise its market power, notably by increasing the price of the goods but 
also causing other negative effects on the market, such as reduction of output, 
deterioration in quality or reduction of incentives for innovation17. Conglomerate 
effects take place in different antitrust markets; for this reason they can be 
characterized as ‘’indirect’’ effects and be distinguished from horizontal and vertical 
effects which arise in the same antitrust market18.  
The main concerns in a conglomerate merger is the threat of foreclosure and 
the use of anti-competitive practices through the combination of products in related 
markets, which may enable merged undertakings to leverage a strong market 
position19. Leveraging can produce adverse effects on the market in case the 
conglomerate entity uses economic strategies when selling its products or behave, in 
general, strategically in order to eliminate its rivals20. 
A conglomerate merger may result in the acquisition of products that are 
complementary to its already existing, in the integration of unrelated products or in 
the combination of products belonging in neighboring markets, giving, in this way, the 
                                                 
16 Damien Neven, ‘The analysis of conglomerate effects in EU merger control’ in 
Advances in the Economics of Competition Law (MIT Press 2005) 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.598.5325&rep=rep1&typ
e=pdf> accessed 30 December 2018 (p. 5) 
17 R Whish and D Balley,818 
18 Damien Neven, 5 
19 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 93 
20 Giorgio Monti, 272 
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opportunity to the merged undertaking to engage in tying, bundling or foreclosure 
practices21. The most serious problems arise when a conglomerate merger involve 
undertakings with complementary products, because the concentration of products 
under a single control may enable the merged entity to tie or bundle the complements 
so as to obtain profits from customers, as long as competitors sell them separately and 
cannot react effectively22. 
The strategy of tying is found in cases when the purchase of a certain good (the 
tying product) has as a prerequisite the purchase of another good (the tied good) and 
its variant, requirements tying, occurs when consumers are obliged to purchase all the 
requirements of the tied good in order to acquire the tying good23. In addition, tying 
can take place both on technical and contractual basis. In the first situation, the tying 
product functions only with the tied product and not with similar competitive 
products, and in the second, customers who buy the tying good commit to purchase 
also the tied good and not alternative goods produced by competitors24. Moreover, a 
merged entity may use commercial tying by threating its customers not to supply them 
with a certain product, if they do not buy other products or a whole range of products 
(‘’full-line forcing’’)25.  
In bundling two categories are identified: when the products are only sold 
jointly, in a fixed proportion, there is pure bundling; conversely, when the products can 
be sold separately but at higher price than if they were sold together, there is mixed 
bundling26. The strategy of bundling may be assessed under a ‘’dynamic view’’, in the 
sense that account must be taken of all the possible effects on consumer welfare, both 
in the short and in the long term27. Specifically, lower prices due to bundling may 
enable the merged entity to increase prices in medium or long-term as follows: a) the 
merged entity initially chooses to reduce, in at least one market, the price of goods 
                                                 
21 Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP), European Commission, The impact 
of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition (author:Jeffrey Church, 2004) 
130 
22 Damien Neven, 30  
23 DG COMP (2004), 130 
24 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 97 
25 Götz Drauz, 889 
26 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 96 
27 Damien Neven, 17 
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which are bundled below pre-merger levels, b) competitors or potential competitors 
do not have the ability to respond in this practice, c) buyers cannot use countervailing 
mechanisms to hold prices, d) competitors are forced to exit (or potential rivals cannot 
enter in the market), and finally e) the merged company gain the power to raise prices 
and make significant profit28. Essentially, the merged entity decides to sacrifice its 
profit in short-term so as to recover it after competitors’ exit or weakening.    
There are also some situations where the use of tying and bundling can 
increase the probability of competition harm, especially in a long term basis: 1) when 
the undertaking has significant power in the market of the tying product (or in one of 
the bundled products), 2) when the efficiencies of the disputed practices are weak (or 
absent), 3) when the rivals face a great increase in their cost of production due to the 
above market strategies or consider unprofitable to follow them, 4) when the number 
of buyers who want to acquire only the tying good (or a part of the bundle) is large, 
and 5) when the merged entity will have an incentive to raise the price of the 
combined  products above pre-merger levels29.     
 Nevertheless, according to Proctor30 a merged company does not always have 
the incentive to foreclose competitors when the products are complements. The 
author supports that, as long as conglomerate effects require significant market power 
in one of the complementary products, a possible reduction in competition in the tied 
good may affect negatively the demand for the other complement (the ‘’monopoly 
product’’). The reduction in the demand may be due to the fact that customers react 
negatively to this pricing strategy and stop buying both products (tying and tied or the 
bundle). Consequently, a conglomerate merger can be harmful for the competition 
only if the competitors are weak and do not provide quality products or if the merged 
entity has to foreclose competitors in order to avoid future risks (e.g. danger to lose its 
dominant position because of a competitor)31.  
                                                 
28 OECD (2002), 8-9 
29 Ibid, 7 
30 Adrian Proctor, ‘Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure’ 
(2015) 4(38)World Competition, p.2 <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68137/> 
accessed 29 December 2018 (p.3)   
31 Ibid 
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The European Commission has also expressed the opinion that tying and 
bundling are expected to have significant anti-competitive effects only when at least 
one of the merging companies’ products are considered from a large number of buyers 
as particular important and rivals do not offer many alternatives32.    
 In addition to the described market strategies which can emerge after a 
conglomerate merger, the combination of products belonging in neighbouring or 
closely related markets (mainly complements) may enable the merged entity to 
change its pricing strategy and form new conditions in these markets33. These are the 
so-called portfolio effects that can indirectly magnify the market power of the merged 
entity without directly altering market structure, and arise when the merging parties 
enjoy market power in the aforementioned markets34. For instance, the post-merger 
entity may have the ability to offer packages of products very attractive for customers, 
who will prefer to buy the goods that they need from one company rather than 
searching in different sources, so competitors who provide these products separately 
will not be able to compete35. The merged entity may concentrate significant 
competitive advantages if it endorses on its portfolio different products and acquire a 
market power ‘’in excess of the sum of its parts’’36. More specifically, if the company 
acquires, post-merger, a significant variety of products, it will have the ability to 
foreclose competitors without needing to make its products more competitive, as it 
can gain a ‘’portfolio or range advantage’’ over them, meaning that the merged 
company will supply a greater variety of products which may lead to monopolization in 
case that consumers appreciate this variety37.  
In a conglomerate merger there might also arise concerns relating to spillover 
benefits when one merging party has a strong brand and the other parties of merger 
does not; in particular, when a ‘’pull through’’ effect from strong to weak brand takes 
                                                 
32 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 99 
33 Götz Drauz, 885 
34 OECD (2002), 23 
35 Moritz Lorenz, An introduction to EU Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 
2013) 293 
36 Jurgita Malinauskaite, Merger Control in Post-Communist Countries. EC merger 
regulation in small market economies (Routledge 2011) 84, See also Case IV/M.938 
Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, Commission Decision of 15 October 1997, para. 38 
37 DG COMP (2004),xx 
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place and company’s market shares are repositioned so as to enhance the quality of 
the weak product at the expense of competing brands38. However, in this situation it is 
uncertain if such actions can substantially harm free competition and also if it is in the 
interest of the merged entity to promote a weak brand and change its marketing 
strategy, risking not having the desired impact on its consumers39.   
ii) Coordinated effects 
 
A conglomerate merger may in some situations promote anti-competitive coordination 
in a given market in various ways; either by eliminating effective competitors so as to 
achieve tacit coordination with the remaining ones, or without excluding competitors 
from the market, by forcing them to follow a price raise because of their vulnerable 
position40.  
 Moreover, a conglomerate merger may increase the competition between 
undertakings in multiple markets, the so-called ‘multi-market contact’ which enhances 
the sustainability of coordination and interaction between firms, giving space for more 
severe penalties (that can be across more than one market) and fmore effective 
detection of deviations, in order to ensure the compliance with the rules of 
coordination41. Two factors are necessary for the above coordination: 1) repeated 
interaction between undertakings through competition over prices or quantities and 2) 
the evaluation of future profits and reprisals in case of deviation42.  
 
B. PRO-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
Most of times conglomerate mergers are beneficial for competition and help 
undertakings enhance their financial position. Especially for companies in difficulty, 
struggling to survive in a demanding market, a merger with a robust firm may be 
                                                 
38 Damien Neven, 10 
39 Adrian Proctor, 2 
40 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 120 
41 DG COMP (2004), xlvii 
42 Ibid, 242 
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necessary for their financial rescue43. Mergers have been used several times as means 
to ‘’socialize the debt burden’’, serving as a tool for separating healthy from unhealthy 
parts of business44. A conglomerate merger may also enable merged entity to reduce 
its capital costs and collect large amounts of money from the capital markets by issuing 
new shares45.         
 As regards consumers, the aforementioned mechanisms of tying and bundling 
are possible to improve economic welfare. They can increase output and generally 
foster production efficiencies or ameliorate complementarity among products46. 
Specifically, conglomerate mergers may produce cost savings in the form of economies 
of scope, both in terms of production and consumption when the products are sold 
together rather than separately (for example as a bundle), resulting in the provision of 
complementary products with better compatibility and quality47. In addition, tying and 
bundling can lead to a price drop, for example a mixed bundling can offer economic 
advantages and discounts to customers, provided that these efficiencies will be 
permanent and not a form of strategic pricing to foreclose competitors48, as it was 
discussed above. 
 The traditional economic view supports that tying and bundling of 
complementary products do not produce foreclosure effects, but, on the contrary, are 
beneficial for consumer welfare, based on the ‘’Cournot effect’’ and the ‘’single profit 
theory to complements’’. The Cournot effect takes place when the conglomerate 
company integrates to its potential two complements (which prior to the merger were 
sold by different undertakings) and cause a reduction in the price of both, as the 
merged company understands that the demand for the complement of a product 
increases when the price of this product is decreased and vice-versa49. This function 
enhances consumer welfare and company’s aggregate profit.  
                                                 
43 Jurgita Malinauskaite, 93 
44 Stefan Weishaar, Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement. Law and Economics 
Approaches to Bid Rigging (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 207 
45 Jurgita Malinauskaite, 18 
46 OECD (2002), 30 
47 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 118 
48 Götz Drauz, 888  
49 DG COMP (2004), xx-xxi, 131, 134 
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The single profit theory to complements comes to the conclusion that a monopolist 
supplier has no profit to tie or bundle a monopoly supplied component with another 
non-monopolized, because competitors in the market of the competitive product will 
get the chance to offer alternatives or lower-cost products, and consumers who are 
unwilling to pay for the tied good (or the bundle) will turn to competitors’ products50. 
Furthermore, the efficiency gains resulting from a conglomerate merger may 
provide a ‘one-stop shop’ service, very advantageous for customers who want to buy 
complementary products (that do not compete with one another) which the merged 
entity has the ability to provide them both51. In addition, a conglomerate merger can 
lead to a division of labor, which in turn will contribute to a more effective production 
and to the parallel marketing of components that usually are sold together rather than 
separately52. Portfolio effects may have positive impact to the market, as the offer of a 
full range of products can reduce the cost of transaction/supply for customers and 
contribute to the creation of new types of products or products with a higher quality53.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Ibid 
51 R Whish and D Balley, 821 
52 Miguel de la Mano, ‘Vertical and Conglomerate Effects’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/delamano1.pdf> accessed 28 
December 2018   
53 OECD (2002), 36 
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III. THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 
Globalization and tough competition within Europe force companies to reform their 
structure and merger in order to protect their interests. Since some mergers can 
negatively affect competition, the European authorities take measures to protect the 
function of the single market. In recent years, an increase in cases with conglomerate 
effects has been seen, signaling a new era in the EU Competition Law. 
 
A. CURRENT MERGER REGULATION (REGULATION 139/2004/EC) 
i) General legal framework 
Most competition law regimes treat merger control differently from other anti-
competitive practices, because mergers are better dealt with before their completion 
given that it is very difficult and costly to cancel them once they have already taken 
place54.  
Broadly speaking, the European Union welcomes mergers that increase the 
competitiveness, produce growth and improve the standard of living; however, some 
mergers may impede effective competition, mainly by creating or strengthening a 
dominant position, causing increase on prices, lack of alternatives or reduction of 
incentives for innovation55. In these situations the European authorities implement the 
appropriate procedures under the relevant legislation in order to protect the single 
market. 
 The main legislative texts concerning merger control are: 1) Council Regulation 
(EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings56 (hereinafter: the EUMR) and 2) the Commission Regulation (EC) No 
                                                 
54 Sandra Marco Colino, Competition Law of the EU and UK (7th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2011) 355 
55 European Commission, ‘Procedures in merger control’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/overview_en.html> accessed 8 January 
2019 
56 [2004] OJ L 24/1  
14 
 
802/2004 of 21 April 200457 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 as 
amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1033/2008 of 20 October 200858 and 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1269/2013 of 5 December 201359  
(hereinafter: Implementing Regulation).  
The EUMR has been applicable since 1 May 2004 and amended the rules of the 
previous Regulation (EEC) No 4064/893. It made the division of responsibilities 
between Member States and European Commission more flexible and modified the 
substantive test for the analysis of mergers. The EUMR contains some basic principles 
that distinguish merger control from other areas of EU competition law enforcement 
and provides the rules for the assessment of concentrations, whereas the 
Implementing Regulation deals with procedural issues (notifications, deadlines, the 
right to be heard etc.). Commission Notices and Guidelines play an important role for 
the interpretation of the Merger Regulation as well as "Best Practice Guidelines" which 
the Commission published concerning the relationship between case team and 
parties/third parties during the procedure (pre-notification contacts, meetings, 
provision of documents)60. 
The EUMR applies to all concentrations61 with a ‘Community dimension’62, that 
is, undertakings which meet the criteria laid down in Article 1 (2) and (3) of the 
Regulation. More specifically, it is examined the annual turnover of the merging parties 
and If it exceeds specified thresholds concerning global and European sales, the 
                                                 
57 [2004] OJ L 133/1 
58 [2008] OJ L 279/3 
59 [2013] OJ L 336/1 
60 See European Commission, Competition, Mergers, Legislation 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/legislation.html> accessed 10 
January 2019 
61 According to article  3(1) of the EUMR, a concentration is considered to arise ‘‘where 
a change of control on a lasting basis results from: a) the merger of two or more 
previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings, or (b) the acquisition, by 
one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more 
undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other 
means, of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other 
undertakings.’’ 
62 EUMR, art 1 (1) 
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merger must be pre-notified to the European Commission63. The annual turnover 
required by an undertaking in order to fall within the provisions of the EUMR, makes it 
clear that only the very large mergers are reviewed.  
If the annual turnover is lower, the Commission is not competent and the 
national competition authorities of the relevant state check the merger. A 
concentration with a Community dimension cannot be implemented either before its 
notification or until it has been declared compatible with the single market64. 
The principle of ‘one-stop merger control’ is applied, meaning where a merger 
has a Community dimension the Commission has sole jurisdiction65. Therefore, 
Member-States are not allowed to apply their domestic law in these mergers, apart 
from some specific situations referred to in the EUMR66. It is irrelevant whether the 
registered office of the undertakings is based outside the European Union, as there is a 
risk that the function of the single market will be affected if the merging undertakings 
operate within it, even if its seat is outside Europe67. 
 Mergers which would significantly impede effective competition, in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the 
common market; conversely, mergers which do not significantly impede competition 
are unconditionally approved by the Commission68. Consequently, in the area of 
merger control under the EUMR, the so-called SIEC (Significant Impediment to 
Effective Competition) test plays an essential role and determines the result of the 
Commission’s decision depending on whether the proposed merger can provide the 
                                                 
63
 EUMR, art 4(1): ‘’Concentrations with a Community dimension defined in this 
Regulation shall be notified to the Commission prior to their implementation and 
following the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the 
acquisition of a controlling interest.’’ 
64 EUMR, art 7 (1) 
65 R Whish and D Balley, 829 
66
 EUMR, art 21. In certain cases a concentration that has a Community dimension can 
be referred by the Commission to Member States under the provisions of Article 4(4) 
and Article 9. 
67 According to Recital 10 of the EUMR a concentration should be deemed to have a 
Community dimension ‘irrespective of whether or not the undertakings effecting the 
concentration have their seat or their principal fields of activity in the Community, 
provided they have substantial operations there’. 
68 EUMR, art 2 (2) and (3) 
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merged entity with a market power able to function as a significant impediment to 
effective competition69. The SIEC test, as implemented by the Commission, releases 
the competitive analysis from the problematic use of the dominant position test and 
leads to a fairer approach based on the predicted effects on competition, taking also 
into account all available means when assessing the notified merger70. 
 All the decisions of the Commission are subject to judicial review by the 
General Court of the EU in Luxembourg and there is the possibility of a further appeal 
to the European Court of Justice, based on grounds of law71. 
It is noted that in the EUMR there is no explicitly stated framework for the 
analysis of conglomerate mergers, hence this type of merger falls under the general 
rules of the Regulation that refer to ‘’concentrations’’.  
ii) Restructuring efforts 
In 2009 the European Commission started a process for the assess of the functioning of 
different aspects of EU merger control and identified possible areas for refinement, 
improvement and simplification, leading in 2014 in the adoption of the White Paper 
‘’Towards More Effective EU merger control’’72. This is a remarkable policy initiative in 
the field of merger control given that there has been no reform of Regulation 
139/2004 / EC for a decade after its adoption. 
The White Paper contains few but significant changes for a limited review of 
the EUMR, trying to extend its scope with targeted and proportionate criteria so as to 
close the enforcing gap in the case of minority shareholding acquisitions, and also to 
                                                 
69 B Oppermann and A Chmeis, ‘The Uniform Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU  
in German Competition Law’ in A Almasan and P Whelan (eds), The Consistent 
Application of EU Competition Law. Substantive and Procedural Challenges (Springer 
2017) 204 
70 Andreas Weitbrecht, ‘A well-watered plateau: EU merger control 2011-2013’ (2014) 
35 (6), European Competition Law Review 286 
71 Article 263 para. 1 TFEU: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the 
legality of legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the 
European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-
à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies 
of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.” 
72 European Commission, ‘’Towards more effective EU merger control’’ (White Paper, 
COM 449, 2014)  
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simplify and rationalize the procedures with regard to referral mechanisms, extra-EEA 
joint ventures and non-problematic mergers73. Regarding the restructuring efforts of 
merger control, in general, the Commission’s argues that merger review can foster 
innovation, as competition leads to better market outcomes, such as lower prices, 
increased output, improvement of products’ quality and variety74. 
In particular, the Commission states, among other things, that the revised 
EUMR provides a good framework for effectively protecting competition and 
consumers from anti-competitive effects of mergers in the internal market. The 
Commission notices also that the introduction of the SIEC test enabled to review non-
coordinated effects of transactions where the merged entity would not acquire a 
dominant position75. However, in order to simplify merger procedures, modifications 
were proposed concerning: a) certain categories of transactions that normally do not 
raise any competition concerns, that is transactions that do not involve any horizontal 
or vertical relationships between the merging undertakings and that may have to be 
exempted from mandatory prior notification and b) full-function joint ventures located 
and operating totally outside the EEA which may have to fall out of the scope of the 
EUMR76.  
The problem that the Commission tries to resolve by reviewing the legal 
framework for the joint ventures is related to cases where parent companies with a 
high turnover set up a joint venture which does not operate within the EEA territory 
and for which reason the turnover test ends up going beyond the scope of the EU 
merger control77. 
Moreover, there are proposed measures for case referrals, aiming to make the 
system more effective on an overall basis, without fundamentally reforming its 
features78. Under the proposals, pre-notification referrals to the Commission (Article 
4(5) EUMR) would become more business-friendly and the one-stop shop principle 
                                                 
73 Ulrich von Koppenfels, ‘A Fresh Look at the EU Merger Regulation? The European 
Commission’s White Paper “Towards More Effective EU Merger Control”’ (2015) 36 
Liverpool Law Review 30 
74 White Paper (2014), para. 14 
75 Ibid, para. 78 
76 Ibid, para. 77 
77 Ulrich von Koppenfels, 29 
78 Ibid, paras. 64 et seq. 
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would be implemented to post-notification referrals by Member States to the 
Commission (Article 22 EUMR), so as to avoid parallel investigations and enable the 
Commission to examine the notified merger for the whole European single market79. 
Considerations were expressed about the acquisition of control of an 
undertaking and especially, the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings 
for which the Commission proposed the extension of the EUMR so as to fall under its 
regulatory framework80. The main problem in these situations is that under the EUMR 
the Commission can only examine pre-existing minority shareholdings when a merger 
is notified; consequently when subsequent acquisition of a minority stake takes place 
after the examination of the acquisition of control over another undertaking, the 
Commission has no competence to investigate and intervene, although there may be 
competition concerns81. For instance, a minority share held by a company to a 
competitor may facilitate both companies to coordinate their behaviour on the 
market, especially if the shareholder has access to confidential business information 
about the target, raising, in this way, competition concerns in terms of coordinated 
effects82. 
Two options has been proposed: a) a mandatory notification system, and b) a 
selective system in which the Commission will have the opportunity to select only 
mergers that may cause competitive harm; a system that is preferable because it 
focuses only on certain transactions and relieves the rest of unnecessary 
administrative procedures83. However, it is argued that there is no sufficient evidence 
that the scope of the EUMR should be extended to cover non-controlling minority 
shareholdings, as the principal theories of competitive harm occur rarely in these cases 
in practice, or their effects on competition usually become apparent after some years 
                                                 
79 Johannes Luebking, ‘The EU Merger Regulation Ten Years after the 2004 Review’ 
(2014) 5(4), Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 186 
80 White Paper (2014), paras. 24 et seq. 
81 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document ‘’Towards more 
effective EU merger control’’ (SWD(2013) 239 final), 5 
82 Ulrich von Koppenfels, 13 
83 Joacquin Almunia, ‘Merger review past evolutions and future prospects’ (2012), 
Conference on Competition Policy, Law and Economics Cernobbio (Italy), SPEECH 
2012/773 (p. 5)  
19 
 
and it is difficult to predict if this future conduct could lead in situations which impede 
free competition84.  
Moreover, the above view supports that the Commission has the possibility to 
effectively apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to the acquisition of non-controlling 
minority shareholdings, whilst any extension of the EUMR’s scope will be detrimental 
for the undertakings, causing additional financial costs and regulatory uncertainty85. 
The counter-argument put forward in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is 
that these provisions cannot cover all cases in which non-controlling minority 
shareholdings may harm competition.  
In particular, it is alleged that, since the application of Article 101 TFEU requires 
an agreement between the parties that can be regarded as having an anti-competitive 
effect, the purchases of minority shareholdings through the stock exchange are hardly 
within the scope of that provision and, moreover, the articles of association of an 
undertaking in which a minority shareholding is acquired cannot be qualified as such 
an agreement, because of the existence of non-participating third party 
shareholders86.  
For these reasons, it is argued that a relevant review would provide the 
appropriate legal framework for dealing with the long-term acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings, as the EUMR is the more specific tool for the competition reform 
concerning transactions which result in a change in the structure of companies in a 
given market, either through a change in control or through structural links created by 
non-controlling minority stakes87.       
Thereinafter, in October 2016, the Commission launched a public three-month 
consultation seeking feedback on the effectiveness of the EUMR, especially relating to 
the simplification of referral mechanisms between Members States and the 
Commission, and also the effectiveness of the turnover-based jurisdictional thresholds. 
The debate was focused on whether the determined thresholds allow to capture all 
transactions that can potentially affect the internal market, a very important issue 
                                                 
84 Nicholas Levy, ‘EU merger control and non-controlling minority shareholdings: the 
case against change’ (2013) 9 (3), European Competition Journal 722 
85 Ibid, 752 
86 Johannes Luebking, 185 
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particularly for the digital and pharmaceutical sectors, where the turnover of a 
company may be low but its market potential can be significant for non-strictly 
economic reasons (for example the possession of valuable data)88.  
The results of consultation were published in July 2017 and the participants 
(National Competition Authorities, public bodies, associations and others) proposed 
modifications relating to: 1) the simplification of the merger control procedure; mainly 
exempting certain categories of cases from the pre-notification obligation in order to 
alleviate companies from additional costs, 2) the functioning of the jurisdictional 
thresholds, where only a minority proposed changes while the majority of respondents 
did not see any need for introducing complementary jurisdictional thresholds, 3) the 
functioning of the referral system (reform of pre-notification referrals under Article 
4(4) and (5) EUMR) and 4) specific technical aspects89. However, the Commission has 
not cleared yet whether it will press ahead with modifications on the basis of the 
Consultation. 
B. THE COMMISSION’S ROLE 
i) Concerning mergers in general 
Under the EUMR the Commission has a wide range of competencies, since it has the 
possibility to prohibit entirely the realization of a merger90. The proceedings that the 
Commision follows can be broken down into two main stages: 1) Phase I, which applies 
to the procedures leading to a first decision and 2) Phase II, which applies when a more 
substantial examination of the notified merger is needed and a further procedure 
                                                 
88 European Commission, Consultation on Evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional 
aspects of EU merger control 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.htm
> accessed 11 January 2019  
89 See European Commission, Summary of replies to the Public Consultation on 
Evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control (July 2017) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/summary_of_
eplies_en.pdf> accessed 11 January 2019 
90 EUMR, art 8 (3) 
21 
 
takes place. The Commission is obliged to examine the notification and complete the 
process in specific time limits91. 
In Phase I the Commission examines the notification of the proposed merger 
and takes one of these three possible decisions92: 1) to declare that the merger does 
not have a community dimension so the Commission has no competence, 2) to declare 
the merger compatible with the internal market since, although it falls within the 
scope of the EUMR, it does not raise serious anti-competitive doubts and 3) to declare 
that the megrer has a Community dimension and also raises serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with the single market.  
In this case the Commission initiates proceedings under Phase II, in accordance 
with Article 6 (1) (c) of the EUMR. The proceedings are closed by means of a decision 
as provided for in Article 8 (1) to (4) of the EUMR, unless the undertakings 
demonstrate that they have abandoned the merger. Specifically, at the end of Phase II 
the Commission decides whether the merger is:  
- compatible with the single market [Article 8(1) EUMR] or  
- compatible with the single market, following modifications made by the 
participating undertakings [Article 8(2) EUMR]or  
-incompatible with the single market [Article 8(3) EUMR] or  
-if a merger has already been implemented and is incompatible with the single 
market, or has been implemented in breach of a condition set in the EUMR, the 
Commission may require its dissolution or other appropriate measures (Article 8(4) 
EUMR). 
 In practice, the Commission rarely decides to block a merger and in the 
majority of cases asks from the merging parties to offer commitments to modify 
certain issues that raise competition concerns (the so-called remedies93), in order to 
approve the merger. In particular, according to the Commission’s statistics, there have 
been only 27 prohibitions of mergers from 21 September 199094 to 31 December 2018, 
in a total of 7219 notified cases (including cases that were withdrawn in Phase I or in 
                                                 
91 See EUMR, art 9 and 10  
92 EUMR, art 6 (1) (a), (b) and (c) 
93 See Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004, [2008] OJ C 267/1 
94 When the first European Merger Regulation No 4064/1989 entered into force 
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Phase II of the the EUMR)95. According to the Commission’s White paper (2014), the 
large majority of mergers investigated, do not raise competition concerns and are 
cleared in Phase I, and in less than 5% of cases an in-depth Phase II investigation is 
launched based on initial concerns raised in Phase I96. 
 ii) Concerning mergers with possible conglomerate effects 
Initially the European Commission was focused on horizontal mergers which, in 
general, were considered more likely to cause anti-competitive effects. However, in 
the early 2000s the Commission prohibited the GE/Honeywell and Tetra Laval/Sidel 
conglomerate mergers, fearing possible anti-competitive effects in the relevant 
markets.  
Τhe main role of the Commission concerning potential conglomerate effects 
was to investigate the possibility of competitors’ foreclosure or tacit collusion which 
can harm significantly free competition; nevertheless, for many years there was no 
certainty about the Commission’s practices 97. 
In order to provide more clarity, in 2008 the Commission published the 
Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings98.  
Τo avoid any confusion, it is noted that the term “concentration” used in the 
EUMR covers various types of transactions, such as mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, 
and certain types of joint ventures, and that the term “merger” is used in the 
Guidelines’ text as a synonym for concentration, covering all these types of 
transactions99. 
The Guidelines delineate how the Commission evaluates a conglomerate (and 
also a vertical) merger when the merging parties operate in different relevant markets. 
In their context the Commission states the opinion that non-horizontal mergers are 
                                                 
95 See <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf> accessed 9 January 
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96 White Paper (2014), para. 6 
97 R Whish and D Balley, 876 
98 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C265/6 
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generally less likely to significantly impede effective competition than horizontal 
mergers and that this type of mergers provides substantial scope for efficiencies100. It 
also notices that a merger may produce both horizontal and non-horizontal effects 
when, for example, the merging parties are active or potential competitors in one or 
more markets and, in the same time, have a vertical or conglomerate relationship101. 
In this situation the Commission must examine all the possible effects that can emerge 
from this complex merger.  
 Especially for conglomerate mergers, it is pointed out that, in the majority of 
circumstances, these mergers do not produce any anti-competitive effects, unless the 
conglomerate entity is expected to use indirect tactics to foreclose competitors 
(usually tying or bundling); in this situation the Commission should examine if: 1) the 
merged company will have indeed the ability to foreclose, 2) there is economic 
incentive to act in this way, and 3) the foreclosure strategy would be significantly 
detrimental for competition and harmful for consumers102.  
However, recent decisions show that the Commission has started a new circle 
of rigorous examination relating to conglomerate effects, as in 2016 and 2017 it 
subjected to an in-depth investigation the follow seven concentrations (including 
mergers and acquisitions) that raised conglomerate concerns: Dentsply/Sirona (dental 
equipment and consumables); Worldline/Equens/Paysquare (European payment  
companies and relevant machines); Microsoft/Linkedin (computer operating systems 
and social networking services); Broadcom/Brocade (computer processors and 
interface cards); Qualcomm/NXP (baseband chipsets for smartphones and chips 
enabling short-range connectivity for secure payment transactions on smartphones) 
Essilor/Luxottica (eyewear and ophthalmic lenses) and Bayer/Monsanto (pesticides 
and seeds)103.  
                                                 
100 Ibid, paras. 11-13 
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C. RELEVANT CASES 
i) GE/ Honeywell104 
General Electric/Honeywell International was a case that received a great deal of 
attention and attracted media coverage, as the merger between these two American 
undertakings was permitted in the United States and in eleven other jurisdictions, but 
was prohibited by the European Commission, causing a friction between EU and US105. 
The aforementioned merger had been billed as the largest industrial merger in history 
until then and the remarkable thing is that the US and EU authorities had a different 
assessment of broadly similar facts106.  
The conglomerate nature of the case was evident for both the Commission and 
the legal community due to the complementarity of products and services concerning 
aerospace market, as well as the common customer base of the merging companies107. 
One of the Commission's major concerns was the ability of the merged company to 
bundle its products, which was not an obvious situation, as the bundling mechanism 
had not played important role in European merger control before108. 
The relevant parties entered into an agreement on 22 October 2000 under 
which Honeywell would become a wholly owned subsidiary of GE. On 5 February 2001, 
the Commission received the notification of the proposed concentration pursuant to 
Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, by which the General Electric Company (GE) 
of the USA has agreed to acquire the entire share capital of Honeywell International 
Inc. (Honeywell) of the USA.  
GE was a diversified industrial corporation, active in many fields including 
aircraft engines, appliances and power systems, while Honeywell was an advanced 
technology and manufacturing company serving customers worldwide with a range of 
goods including power systems, aerospace products and services. Consequently, the 
product market that would be affected by the combination of the two businesses was 
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a part of the aerospace and the power systems industries. GE held a dominant position 
in the market for large jet aircraft engines (between 43 and 65% depending on how 
market share were calculated), and Honeywell had a leading position in the avionics 
and non-avionics aerospace component markets. 
The notified operation were deemed to have a Community dimension as the 
undertakings concerned had a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of more than 
EUR 5 000 million and both had a Community-wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 
million109. Hence, the Commission had to examine, according to article 2 of the 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, if the merger would create or strengthen a dominant 
position, as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in 
the common market. 
The Commission decided (para. 341) that the proposed merger would cause 
anti-competitive effects due to horizontal overlaps in conjuction with vertical and 
conglomerate integration of the merging parties activies, because GE had dominant 
positions in the markets for large commercial aircraft engines and large regional jet 
aircraft engines and, in parallel, Honeywell enjoyed significant leading positions in the 
markets for avionics and non- avionics110 as well as in engine starters.  
Following the transaction GE would strenghten its position on the markets for 
large commercial aircraft engines and for large regional jet aircraft engines and would 
create a dominant position on the markets for corporate jet engines, while Honeywell 
would become dominant in the Buyer- Furnished- Equipment (BFE), Supplier-Furnist-
                                                 
109 According to Article 1of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89: ‘’… a 
concentration has a Community dimension where; (a) the aggregate worldwide 
turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5 000 million, and (b) the 
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Equipment111 (in SFE-standard and SFE-option112) avionics markets. Actually, the 
Commission feared that the financial strenght of GE and its intention to expand into 
new markets would have anti-competitive effects because it would have the ability to 
offer a unique combination of complementary products which its rivals would not be 
able to compete. This approach was criticized by some authors. 
In particular, it was argued that the Commission adopted to a certain extent 
the doctrine ‘’Big is Bad’’, as it seemed hostile towards robust companies that tried to 
conquer new markets by merging with important players of these markets and offering 
attractive product packages to customers; market practices that cannot be considered 
per se anti-competitive or unlawful113.      
Regarding possible conglomerate effects, the Commission expressed the 
opinion that an engine is a complementary product to the aircraft because the demand 
of the one derives from the demand of the other (para. 9), and stressed that there is a 
risk that the merged entity use the strategy of bundling, in order to foreclose its 
competitors, as ‘’(t)he complementary nature of the GE and Honeywell product 
offerings coupled with their respective existing market positions will give the merged 
entity the ability and the economically rational incentive to engage in bundled offers or 
cross-subsidisation across product sales to both categories of customers’’ (para. 349). 
The Commission’s decision to prohibit the merger received a lot of criticism for various 
reasons and there was a number of points that made the Comnmission's reliance on 
bundling questionable. 
More specifically, the Commission’s market investigation showed that the 
parties could offer a) mixed and/or b) technical bundling: a) offer the same product at 
two different prices depending on whether or not the product is included in the bundle 
                                                 
111 The distinction between the two is that BFE equipment is purchased by the airlines, 
whilst for SFE equipment, the procurement responsibility is taken on by the airframe 
manufacturers (see para. 236 of the Commission’s decision) 
112 In para. 239 of the decision is pointed out that: “SFE can either be SFE-standard or 
SFE-option. The former is single-sourced, whilst for SFE option the airframe 
manufacturer will obtain certification for more than one (generally two) substitutable 
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113 D Patterson and C Shapiro, ‘Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and 
Lessons’ (2001) 16 (1), Antitrust, 20 
27 
 
(the lower price being applied in cases where the bundle is purchased), b) make its 
products available only as an integrated system that is incompatible with competing 
individual components, so as competitors cannot place their products on the market, 
since technical bundling restricts the market share available (paras. 351-355) 
As regards the possibility of the engagment in exclusionary bundling with the 
ultimate effect of foreclosing markets for single product line competitors (particularly 
Rolls Royce in aircraft engines and Rockwell Collins in aerospace components) it should 
be noted that the Commission did not evaluate properly the nature of competition in 
aerospace industry, where there were strong buyers, diversified products and 
individually traded transactions and relied entirely on possible range effects114.  
By contrast, according to the economic theory developed by Choi, the merger 
had to be approved only subject to a restriction of bundling, since conglomerate 
mergers with mixed bundling would primarily be anti-competitive for customers who 
purchased a ‘’mix-and-match system’’ (a system that includes a component of the 
merged entity and a rival’s component) and would be negatively affected due to the 
increased stand-alone prices115. However, the author recognized that mixed bundling 
would have been pro-competitive for customers who bought both products from the 
two merging parties and would benefit from the lower price of the bundle116. This fact, 
combined with the special nature of the aerospace market and the strength of the 
involved competitors, supports the view that the merger should not have been 
prohibited or at least should have been accepted after a number of commitments of 
the merging companies. 
Another significant error of the decision was that it equated the potential price 
reduction caused by GE/Honeywell’s merger and its possible aggressive market 
strategy with the foreclosure effect, disregarding that this fact could enhanced free 
competition and the incentive of rivals to develop and sold more products in the 
relevant market117. However, it was claimed that the Commission encountered 
evidence showing that bundling strategy could be coupled with portfolio effects, 
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resulting in a competition-avoidance and rivals’ exit in certain segments of the market 
concerned, where the cost of competing was high and risky118. 
In response to this scenario, it was argued that since the European Merger 
Control focused on the situation of the parties at the time the merger took part and 
not on possible future behavior, the Commission should not have based its decision 
upon a foreclosure strategy which was not actually implemented and the effects and 
financial impact of which were uncertain119.  
The Commission should also have taken into account that it was a global-scale 
merger, which involved significant externalities and that the decision to block, when 
many other jurisdictions approved the merger, deprivided consumers worldwide of the 
benefits the merger might have brought them120. The Commission instead of 
prohibiting the merger could have used appropriate remedies in order to eliminate the 
sources of dominance in the aerospace market, thus allowing airline customers and 
suppliers to benefit from the efficiency gains resulting from the combination of the 
complementary products of the two undertakings121.  
The Commission’s decision was sharply criticized by Charles James, Assistant 
Attorney General of the U.S. Antitrust Division, before the OECD Global forum on 
Competition, in 2001. He stated that EU antitrust law seemed to focus on the 
protection of competitors from the natural operation of the market, instead of 
protecting consumers from the market failure, given that ‘’the competitive process is 
largely about encouraging the more efficient to grow at the expense of the less 
efficient’’ and not about safeguarding inefficient rivals who cannot respond to 
competitive challenges122. Moreover, Charles James stressed that the theory of 
portfolio or range effects was not based on strong economic arguments neither on 
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empirical evidence and it was contrary to the objectives of the proper application of 
antitrust legislation123.    
Finally, GE and Honeywell brought actions before the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) for annulment of the decision124 but the decision was upheld by the CFI in 
December 2005, as the Court held that, despite the manifest errors of assessment by 
the Commission in relation to the effects of the concentration on particular markets, 
its findings on the horizontal effects of the merger on three other markets would be 
sufficient to establish that the decision to prohibit the merger between GE and 
Honeywell was well founded (para. 734, Case T-210/01).  
However it should be noted that, concerning the conglomerate effects resulting 
from bundling (possible pure bundling, mixed-bundling or technical bundling) the 
Court acknowledged that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment, as the 
mere fact that the merged entity would have a wider range of products than its 
competitors did not suffice to demonstrate that it would create or strengthen 
dominant positions in the various relevant markets, since the Commission did not 
sufficiently establish that the merged entity would have bundled sales of GE’s engines 
with Honeywell’s avionics and non-avionics products (para. 470). 
In conclusion, the EU's cautious approach to mergers between companies with 
significant economic power and its intention to protect small businesses led the 
Commission to pay close attention to the interests of competitors affected by the 
merger to the detriment of consumers who would benefit from this, and forget that 
one of the key functions and incentives for a merger is the possibility of lowering prices 
and gaining a superior position vis-à-vis competitors125.  
 
 
                                                 
123 Ibid 
124 Case T-210/01, General Electric Company v. Commission [2005] ECR II-5575 and 
Case T-209/01, Honeywell International Inc v Commission [2005] ECR I- 5527 
125 D Evans and M Salinger, ‘Competition Thinking at the European Commission: 
Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeywell Merger’ (2002) 10 (3), George Mason Law 
Review 526, 528 
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ii) Tetra Laval/Sidel126  
The issue of possible conglomerate effects due to the use of market strategies of 
bundling and tying also played a prominent role in Tetra Laval/Sidel case.  
 On 18 May 2001, the Commission received a notification pursuant to Article 4 
of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of a proposed concentration by which Tetra Laval S.A., 
France, would acquire control of the French company Sidel S.A. by way of a public bid. 
The notified operation were deemed to have a Community dimension as the 
undertakings concerned had a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of more than 
EUR 5 000 million and both had a Community-wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 
million. 
Tetra Laval was a privately held group of companies, active in the design and 
manufacture of equipment, consumables and ancillary services for the processing, 
packaging and distribution of liquid food (known as the Tetra Pak packaging business). 
Tetra Laval’s business included traditional carton packaging, where it was the 
worldwide market leader, and more limited activities in the plastic packaging sector. 
Sidel was a company involved in the design and production of packaging equipment 
and systems, in particular, stretch blow moulding (SBM) machinery, barrier technology 
and filling machines for PET (polyethylene terephthalate) plastic bottles. Especially 
concerning the production and supply of blow-moulding machines, Sidel was the 
world-wide leader. The competitive impact of the concentration would be primarily in 
the liquid food packaging industry, as the parties were mainly active in two segments 
of the liquid food packaging sector (plastic and carton packaging)127.  
The Commission considered that the carton packaging machines sold by Tetra 
Laval and the machines sold by Sidel for (PET) bottles were  technical substitutes, since 
they were alternative packaging methods which could be used by the producers 
                                                 
126 Case M2416 Tetra Laval/Sidel, Commission Decision of 30 October 2001, annulled 
on appeal in Case T 5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission, Judgment of the CFI of 25 October 
2002. The CFI's judgment was upheld by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Case C 
12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval, Judgment of the ECJ of 15 February 2005 
127
 There were four major packaging materials used for liquid food packaging: carton, 
plastic (including PET), cans and glass. Beverage companies used a mix of different 
materials to package their products which was determined by the liquid’s 
characteristics, consumer preferences and tradition, for example glass for wine (see 
more detailed paras. 13-14, Commission Decision of 30 October 2001) 
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(mainly for liquid products). As this substitution was sufficiently weak the Commission 
placed these products in different, but neighboring, antitrust markets (para. 163). 
Furthermore, the Commission’s market investigation showed that the concentration 
could strengthen Tetra Laval’s dominant position in the market for aseptic carton 
packaging128 machines and aseptic cartons. It would create also a dominant position in 
the market for PET packaging equipment; in particular SMB machines in the “sensitive” 
product end-use segments, liquid dairy products, juices, fruit flavoured still drinks and 
tea/coffee drinks129 (para. 213). The Commission concluded that the future dominant 
position of the merged entity in two closely neighbouring markets would be liable to 
hinder the entry of competitors and would lead to a monopoly structure of the whole 
market for aseptic and non-aseptic packaging of sensitive products.  
The Commission expressed also concerns that Tetra Laval would leverage its 
dominant position from carton packaging to SBM machines and would pressure 
(through predatory pricing and price wars) or would incentivize (through discounts) its 
customers to switch to PET equipment and buy SBM machines from Sidel. This could 
cause rivals’ elimination.  
Tetra Laval was committed not to make joint offers for both carton packaging 
and SBM machines but the Commission considered that these behavioral remedies 
were inadequate and that compliance was not easy to be checked. It also mentioned 
that customers having long-term agreements with Tetra Laval for their carton 
packaging needs would be forced through tied sales or bundles to source both their 
carton and PET equipment from a single supplier of carton and PET packaging 
equipment  (paras. 363-365). For these reasons the Commission declared the 
proposed conglomerate concentration incompatible with the common market on 30 
October 2001. 
                                                 
128 In the decision there was a distinction between ‘’aseptic’’ (i.e. sterile) and ‘’non-
aseptic packaging’’. The first is mainly used for liquid products to increase shelf-life and 
avoid refrigerated distribution and although it can be done in all materials, carton is 
the main material used (see para. 46-51, Commission Decision of 30 October 2001) 
129 The beverage industry refers to these products as “sensitive” liquids and they can 
be packaged both in carton and in PET. Traditionally were packaged in carton because 
of their specific characteristics, oxygen and light sensitivity, however they were 
increasingly being packaged in PET as a result of improvements in PET technology and 
changes in consumer demand (see para. 45, Commission Decision of 30 October 2001) 
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One of the biggest problems relating to possible conglomerate effects was that 
the decision focused on the existence of a common pool of customers in the market of 
"sensitive" liquids who wanted both carton and PET machines and to whom a discount 
would be offered on carton machines, if they purchased SMB machines from Sidel 
(mixed bundling strategy) 130. However the Court did not consider that Tetra Laval 
would have to know in advance which customers wanted both products, something 
quite uncertain and also did not evaluate sufficiently if this conduct could have caused 
competitors’ exit131. Given that tying and bundling are not always profitable for a 
company nor capable per-se to cause anti-competitive and foreclosure effects, the 
Commission should have examined more cautiously whether the merged entity had 
incentive to bundle products and, in parallel, the ability to use this strategy when there 
was a significant number of large-scale customers interested in SBM but not in PET 
who would turn in Tetra Laval’s/Sidel competitors to avoid buying a bundle (or tied 
products)132. 
On 25 October 2002, the CFI annulled the Commission’s Decision in its entirety, 
after Tetra Laval’s appeal, based on manifest errors by the Commission in its economic 
analysis of the possible anti-competitive effects, including conglomerate effects. 
Initially the Court provided a definition for the conglomerate merger and 
clarified that this type of merger, like any other type of merger, must be authorised by 
the Commission unless they would significantly impede effective competition (para. 
142 and 146). The Court made this assessment because, although the Commission had 
raised concerns about conglomerate effects in some of its cases in the past years133, it 
was the first time that the CFI examined conglomerate issues in a proposed merger134.  
Concerning the specific nature of conglomerate effects, the Court distinguished 
between two situations:1) those where the effects have a direct impact on 
                                                 
130 Adrian Proctor, 2 
131 Ibid 
132 Damien Neven, 15-16, 36 and see also Tetra’s claims in para. 366, Commission 
Decision of 30 October 2001 
133 Case M.794, Coca Cola/Amalgamated Beverages; Case M.833, Coca Cola/Carlsberg; 
Case M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan 
134 L Prete and A Nucara, ‘Standard of Proof and Scope of Judicial Review in EC Merger 
Cases: Everything Clear after Tetra Laval?’ (2005) European Competition Law Review, 
p. 692-704 < https://ssrn.com/abstract=2568663> accessed 16 January 2019 (p.13) 
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competition on the second market resulting in the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position because of a pre-dominant position in the first market and 2) those 
where the future conduct of the merged entity in the first market (in which already has 
a dominant position) is the cause of  the creation or the strengthening of a dominant 
position in the second market, and not the merger itself (para. 154). The second 
situation, which is more difficult to be assessed by competition authorities, occurred in 
Tetra Laval/Sidel case. 
Moreover, the CFI found three ways in which the Commission based its 
decision to prove that the concentration under consideration could have caused anti-
competitive conglomerate effects:  1) the merger would enable Tetra Laval/Sidel to 
use its dominant position on the carton packaging market so as to establish a 
dominant position on the PET packaging equipment markets, 2) the merger would 
strengthen its dominant position on the markets for aseptic carton packaging 
equipment as it would eliminate the competitive constraint that Sidel represents in the 
neighbouring PET markets and 3) the merger would reinforce the overall position of 
Tetra Laval/Sidel on the market for packaging of ‘’sensitive’’ products (para. 143). 
Especially in the case of a dominant undertaking such as Tetra Laval, the CFI 
held that, when examining the likelihood of the adoption of anti-competitive 
strategies, the Commission must have regard not only to the incentives but also to the 
factors that can reduce or eliminate those incentives (e.g. penalties) which the 
Commission did not take into account (para. 159). The Court finally held that the 
Commission committed manifest errors of assessment in its findings and did not 
provide sufficient and convincing evidence that the merged entity would use 
leveraging methods in order to strengthen its dominant position on the carton 
packaging market and acquire a dominant position in the PET market, and therefore it 
annulled the Commission’s decision. 
The CFI’s judgment leaded to a shift in the Commission’s approach concerning 
conglomerate merges, since prior to that, it considered that the existence of a 
dominant position combined with the ability of the merged entity to engage in 
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leveraging methods (tying/bundling) were sufficient to justify the finding of 
competitive harm135.  
The Commission appealed the CFI’s decision to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) which upheld the CFI’s judgement. The ECJ seemed  to support the approach of 
the CFI concerning the distinguish between the specific nature of conglomerate effects 
and the need for the Commission to provide convincing evidence about the anti-
competitive conduct of the merged entity, ruling (in para. 44) that: ‘’The analysis of a 
'conglomerate-type' concentration is a prospective analysis in which, first, the 
consideration of a lengthy period of time in the future and, secondly, the leveraging 
necessary to give rise to a significant impediment to effective competition mean that 
the chains of cause and effect are dimly discernible, uncertain and difficult to establish. 
That being so, the quality of the evidence produced by the Commission in order to 
establish that it is necessary to adopt a decision declaring the concentration 
incompatible with the common market is particularly important, since that evidence 
must support the Commission's conclusion that, if such a decision were not adopted, 
the economic development envisaged by it would be plausible.’’. 
The above judgment confirmed the possibility of assessing conglomerate 
effects under the Merger Regulation; however the ECJ actually pointed out that it 
would be difficult for the Commission to predict leveraging methods, and even more, 
to provide a high standard of proof concerning possible conglomerate effects that can 
hamper effective competition136. 
 
iii) Microsoft/LinkedIn137 
 
This was a conglomerate concentration approved by the Commission after imposing 
Microsoft to comply with a series of commitments aimed at preserving competition 
between professional social networks in Europe. Microsoft/LinkedIn is one of the rare 
                                                 
135 S Baxtert, F Dethmers and N Dodoo, ‘The GE/Honeywell judgment and the 
assessment of conglomerate effects: What’s New in EC Practice?’ (2006) 2(1) European 
Competition Journal 162 
136 L Prete and A Nucara, 13 
137 Case M 8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn, Commission Decision of 6 December 2016 
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merger cases of the recent years in which the Commission expressed competition 
concerns about possible conglomerate effects. This case is of great interest because it 
deals with competition issues relating to the digital market. 
 On 14 October 2016, the Commission received notification of a proposed 
concentration by which the undertaking Microsoft Corporation, USA (Microsoft) 
acquires the whole of the undertaking LinkedIn Corporation, USA (LinkedIn) by way of 
purchase of shares. The notified concentration had EU dimension (combined aggregate 
world-wide turnover of more than EUR 5 000 million and EU-wide turnover in excess of 
EUR 250 million for each of the undertakings). 
The two parties were active in complementary business areas. Specifically, 
Microsoft was offering operating systems (‘’OS’’138), under the “Windows” name, for 
different devices, including personal computers (PCs), servers, and mobile devices. It 
also offers productivity software139 (including Outlook, Word, Excel and Power Point), 
hardware devices, and online advertising. LinkedIn was operating a professional social 
network ("PSN"140).  
The Commission distinguished eight relevant product markets: PC Oss, 
Productivity software, Customer relationship management (‘’CRM’’141) software 
solutions, Sales intelligence solutions142, Online communications services, PSN services, 
                                                 
138 OSs are “system software products that control the basic functions of computing 
devices5 such as servers, PCs, tablets and mobile devices and enable the user to use the 
device and run application software on it.” (see recital 8). 
139 Productivity software consists of ‘’applications that enable users to create 
documents, databases, graphs, worksheets and presentations or other data structures 
used to exchange information.’’ (see recital 19) 
140 Social networking ("SN") services are “multi-sided platforms that enable users to 
connect, share, discover and communicate with each other across multiple devices 
(mobile and desktop) and means (e.g., via chats, posts, videos, recommendations) … A 
sub-set of SN services are focused on connecting with professional contacts and are 
therefore typically referred to as PSN services.” (see recital 87) 
141
 “CRM software solutions help companies of various industry sectors manage their 
customer interactions by organising, automating and synchronising data from various 
sources, such as sales, marketing, customer database, customer service and technical 
functions” (see recital 29) 
142 “Sales intelligence solutions provide sales professionals with background and 
contact information about individuals (such as name, address, phone number, place of 
employment, title and position, etc.) or companies (such as financial information and 
metrics, etc.)” (see recital 57) 
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Online recruitment services and Online advertising services. The Commission focused 
on three of them: 1) online advertising services, 2) CRM software solutions, and 3) PSN 
services, as they were the more problematic areas.  
It should be noted that the Commission assessed the merger taking into 
account the narrower market for Social Network services, having a different approach 
compared to the Facebook/WhatsApp case143 where it had adopted a broader concept 
that included all the SN services, without distinguishing a separate section of this 
market for professional profiles144. Moreover, the Commission distinguished online 
recruitment services from the relevant offline unlike its previous practice where it had 
stated that online recruitment services could, in theory, be distinguished from online, 
but ultimately left the issue open145. 
Regarding online advertising services the Commission evaluated possible 
horizontal effects concluding that the concentration did not raise serious doubts. The 
Commission rejected any competition concerns regarding the combination of data that 
companies could control after the merger due to the existence of privacy rules (GDPR 
Regulation146) which restrict the access and processing of personal data (para 178). 
In assessing the likelihood of rival’s foreclosure in CRM product market, the 
Commission examined conglomerate non-coordinated effects and specifically, whether 
Microsoft could bundle or tie Sales intelligence solutions offered by LinkedIn (which 
could be used as a complement to CRM software solutions) with its CRM software 
solutions, or use other exclusionary practices so that customers of a competing CRM 
software solution would not have access to the product offered by LinkedIn (para. 
219). The Commission considered that the merged entity would not have the ability to 
foreclose CRM software solutions competitors because LinkedIn did not have a strong 
                                                 
143 Case M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp, Commission Decision of 3 October 2014 
144 F Marini-Balestra and R Tremolada, ‘Digital markets and merger control: balancing 
big data and privacy against competition law - a comment on the European 
Commission's Decision in the Microsoft/LinkedIn Merger’ (2017) 38 (7), European 
Competition Law Review 337 
145 Ibid 
146 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
("GDPR"), repealing the Data Protection Directive, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1-8 
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market position in the relevant market and customers could use alternative products. 
In addition, and there was no clear evidence that a foreclosing strategy would be 
profitable for Microsoft. 
   As regards PSN services, the Commission focused again on conglomerate non-
coordinated effects and looked at whether Microsoft would use its strong market 
position in Windows for PCs and its productivity software to strengthen LinkedIn's 
position among PSNs. More specifically, the Commission was concerned, in Phase I 
Investigation, about: 1) the possible pre-installation of a LinkedIn branded application 
on all PCs running Windows Operating Systems, and 2) the potential integration of 
LinkedIn’s features into Office/Outlook (e.g. making suggestions for new LinkedIn 
contacts on the basis of the Outlook address book, subject to user consent), combined 
with a possible foreclosure of LinkedIn's competitors from accessing Microsoft's 
application programming interfaces (‘APIs’) (para. 306). LinkedIn’s competitors needed 
these APIS so as to interoperate with Microsoft’s products and access user data stored 
in the Microsoft cloud.  
As for the first part of the above concern, the Commission stated that “…in 
principle, software pre-installation can make switching more difficult, in view of users' 
inertia which leads to the so-called ‘status quo bias’" (para. 309) endorsing, in this way, 
the principles of its earlier decision147. In addition, it noted that a pre-installation of the 
LinkedIn application on all or some Windows PCs would be likely to enhance LinkedIn's 
visibility to a very large number of users compared to the pre-merger situation, while 
competing providers of PSN services would not be able to apply counterstrategies for 
their protection (paras. 315 and 320).  
The theory of harm that the Commission used in assessing the pre-installation 
practice seems to reflect the opinions that had already presented in the Microsoft 
case148, where the pre-installation of Microsoft Media Player in all the Window PC 
operating systems was considered a technical bundling which infringed Article 102 
                                                 
147 Case C-3/39.530 Microsoft (Tying), Commission Decision of 16 December 2009 
148 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 
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TFEU, because consumers could not avoid buying the former when buying the latter149. 
In order to address the competition concerns, the Commission essentially used as a 
criterion the ‘’intrinsic inertia’’ of PSN users, that is, their unwillingness to try to 
download other alternative software programs in case that LinkedIn was pre-installed 
on their PCs150.  
Regarding the second part, the Commission claimed that such integration 
would be likely to lead to a significant increase in the number of LinkedIn's members 
and that the merged entity would have incentive to deny competing PSN service 
providers access to Microsoft APIs so as to prevent them from achieving similar levels 
of integration (paras. 331-333). 
For the above reasons the Commission expressed serious doubts and Microsoft 
offered two sets of five-year commitments, the "Integration Commitments" and the 
"Pre-installation Commitments", in order to gain the approval. Microsoft committed to 
make available the Outlook APIs to competitors offering PSN services and to maintain 
existing levels of interoperability (paras. 413-417). In addition, it reassured that PC 
manufacturers and distributors would be free to not install LinkedIn on Windows and 
users would have the possibility to remove the LinkedIn application from the Windows 
PC OS taskbar (paras. 419-421). 
Τhe concerned decision can be subsumed into a new category of recent cases 
of EU Competition Law in the digital market151. The noteworthy about these cases 
concerning conglomerate effects, is that they have modified the concept of tying and 
bundling which originally involved the combined sale of two (or more) products, and 
extended it to the digital era, where it can be applied to the integration of a software 
into an operating system152 or to the pre-installation of an application on all PC’s that 
run a specific operating system, like in Microsoft/LinkedIn.  
                                                 
149 Michele Giannino, Microsoft/LinkedIn: What the European Commission Said on the 
Competition Review of Digital Market Mergers (2017) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005299> accessed 17 January 2019 (p. 8)  
150 F Marini-Balestra and R Tremolada, 339 
151 See Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, Judgment 27 June 2012; Case 
AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), Commission Decision of 27 June 2017; Case AT. 
39.530 Microsoft (Tying), Commission Decision of 6 March 2013 
152  Stefan Holzweber, ‘Tying and bundling in the digital era’ (2018) 14 (2-3), European 
Competition Journal 343 
39 
 
In any case it should be pointed out that in Microsoft/LinkedIn the Commission 
had a different approach, relating to the potential negative impact of network effects 
on competition and the volatile nature of the market share in this digital sector, 
compared to other relevant mergers.  
In previous cases153 the Commission adopted a more ‘’flexible approach’’ 
concluding that large market shares in network markets are not a clear indication of 
market power, since new entries are frequent, there are constant developments in the 
field of innovation and consumers can easily and with a low cost switch provider due 
to the so-called ‘’multi-homing154’’155; however this was not the approach in this case 
as the Commission focused on the possible conglomerate effects and not on the 
merging parties’ market shares which were small, giving also specific attention to the 
particular features of PSN market which presented some special competitive 
advantages that restrict the possibility of multi-homing156.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 See, for example, Case M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp, Commission Decision of 3 
October 2014, para. 133, where the Commission found, in relation to consumer 
communications apps, that “multi-homing is facilitated by the ease of downloading 
apps, which is generally free, easy to access and does not take up much capacity on a 
smartphone.” . 
154 In Facebook/WhatsApp the Commission provide a definition of multi-homing: “… 
consumer communications customers have a broad range of choices when it comes to 
selecting and using consumer communications apps. Many of them use more than one 
consumer communications app simultaneously depending on their specific needs (so-
called “multi-homing”).” (para. 87) 
155 In this context, the notifying party formulated its claims arguing that it would have 
no ability to foreclose competitors in CRN market (see para. 298)  
156 Michele Giannino, 15-16 
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Conclusions 
Since conglomerate mergers are in the majority of cases pro-competitive and lead to 
the creation of economies of scale and consumer welfare, the legal standards for 
establishing that a conglomerate merger should be blocked, because it has a negative 
impact on competition, must be very high.  
 In GE/Honeywell the economic analysis used by the Commission in order to 
assess possible conglomerate effects was an element of great controversy. The final 
prohibition of the merger caused friction between the EU and US authorities and 
opened a new round of discussions about the functioning and objectives of 
Competition Law in European Union. 
The analysis of conglomerate effects changed markedly after Tetra Laval/Sidel 
judgment where the Court made it clear that the Commission should examine the 
incentives of merging undertakings and not only the ability to implement an anti-
competitive conduct, and also that anti-competitive effects cannot be presumed   
without the existence of strong evidence. 
In recent years the Commission has launched public consultations in an 
attempt to modernize and rationalize the European Merger Control, aiming at a more 
business-friendly approach. However, the Commission's latest case-law practice shows 
that EU continues to be cautious about mergers with a conglomerate dimension. 
Developments in merger control are ongoing, hence it is expected with particular 
interest how the Commission will complete the planned changes and treat future 
conglomerate cases. 
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